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ARTICLES
WITHER CONVERGENCE: LEGAL,
REGULATORY, AND TRADE OPPORTUNISM IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Rob Friedent
Technological and marketplace convergence supports the
development of an integrated information communications and
entertainment ("ICE") marketplace.' Yet for various ICE market
segments to function without trade barriers and competitive
distortions, the involved legal, regulatory, and trade policy regimes
must adapt to changed circumstances. Of key importance is the need
to assess whether to change basic definitions and assumptions that
worked in a pre-convergent environment, but which provide
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, such as opportunities to tilt the
competitive playing field to one's advantage by exploiting differences
in classifications and qualifying for a status with less regulatory
obligations and comparatively fewer market access opportunities for
competitors.
t Professor, Penn State University, 105-C Carnegie Building, University Park,
Pennsylvania 16802; (814) 863-7996; e-mail: rmf5@psu.edu.
I. The ICE marketplace also includes goods and services fitting within the broad
classification of intellectual property and electronic commerce. For an assessment whether and
how trade policy forums can handle intellectual property rights issues see Frederick M. Abbott,
The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPS, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 661 (1997); Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising
Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165 (2000); John H.
Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in Information-Intensive Products, 33
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 473 (2001). For an assessment whether and how trade policy
forums can handle e-commerce issues see Stewart A. Baker et al., E-Products and the WTO, 35
INT'L LAW. 5 (2001). See also WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE GENEVA MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION ON GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2 (adopted May 20,
1998), http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/ecome/mindecle.htm; LUDGER SCHUKNECHT &
ROSA PEREZ-ESTEVE, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at http://www.wto.org/english/res e/resere/ae9901_e.htm (Sept.
1999).
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Many workable, semantic dichotomies break down in the
convergent ICE environment, because technological innovations
promote greater service flexibility and markets become more
penetrable absent countervailing regulations and trade policies. For
example, ventures operating in a digital environment can easily bridge
preexisting legal and regulatory distinctions between content creator
and conduit. Similarly, many types of Internet ventures use
digitization to eliminate preexisting regulatory dichotomies between
basic and value-added services, and between different trade policies
and market access commitments made for goods versus services.
Convergence challenges many baseline assumptions about ICE
made by legislators, regulators, jurists, and trade policy makers.
Information services typically qualify for little, if any, regulatory
oversight based on assumptions that they enhance and add value to
regulated basic telecommunications. What happens, though, to this
assumption when an unregulated Internet venture provides services
that are functionally equivalent to what often heavily regulated
telecommunications common carriers provide? Heretofore,
communications ventures fit into a convenient regulatory dichotomy
based on whether they create and disseminate content; for example,
whether they engage in broadcasting, or operate as neutral,
transparent conduits for the content created by others, such as
telecommunications service providers like common carrier telephone
companies. In the preconvergent environment, creators of
entertainment could largely avoid regulation and concentrate on the
creative and business process. As a result of marketplace
convergence opportunities, content creators have turned into content
disseminators like broadcasters, cable television operators, Internet
Service Providers, and satellite operators.
Efforts to liberalize and deregulate telecommunications have
generated less success and more harm than anticipated. This is
primarily because technological and market convergence raise new
issues, and old issues do not simply evaporate through the remedy of
competition. The legal, regulatory, and trade policymaking apparatus
has not kept pace with ICE convergence. As a result, plenty of
opportunities exist for causing delay, exploiting uncertainty, and
using superior skill in gaming and brinkmanship to thwart
competition or to tilt the competitive playing field to one's advantage.
Stakeholders have primarily resorted to competing in courtrooms
rather than in the marketplace, an outcome all the more frustrating
because most of the litigants also helped write the legislation and
negotiate the compromises necessary to enact laws and trade policies.
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Recent deregulatory and market access initiatives have not achieved
"an equilibrium among all parties: regulators, legislators, operators
and consumers."2
Depending on one's perspective, clever and unanticipated
outcomes either help blunt the adverse and meddlesome impact of
poorly drafted legislation and trade policies, or forestall the full
achievement of essential public policy objectives. With great
opportunities to delay, litigate, or dispute the meaning of legislation
and trade opportunities, stakeholders can exploit the nature and scope
of the new and revamped regulatory regime that was designed to
foster competition.3  Asymmetries in regulatory burdens create
incentives for stakeholders, such as carriers and content providers, to
find ways to exploit artificial competitive advantages and to avoid
regulatory classifications that create a bias toward more pervasive and
costly regulatory burdens.4 Asymmetrical regulation has the potential
to tilt the competitive playing field in favor of one category of
stakeholder over others.5
2. Michela Cimatoribus et al., Impacts of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the U.S.
Model of Telecommunications Policy, 22 TELECOMM. POL'Y 493, 509 (1998).
3. With a rather high frequency, appellate courts have rejected the FCC's interpretation
of a legislative mandate, or a Commission unilateral rulemaking initiative. For example, on
several occasions, the FCC unsuccessfully attempted to mandate the elimination of a statutorily
imposed tariff filing requirement:
Commission efforts to move to a nontariff environment for interexchange
carriers-insofar as those carriers do not exercise market power-have not had
an easy time with this court and the Supreme Court. For over six decades a tariff
regime was mandated by the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the
FCC to review telecommunications carriers' tariffs to ensure their
reasonableness. The Act requires carriers to file their tariffs with the FCC, and
they are prohibited from charging consumers except as provided in the tariffs.
Starting in the early 1980s, the Commission tried to prohibit tariff-filing by
nondominant carriers-in essence, those other than AT&T-but that effort was
successfully challenged in this court in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC
where we struck down "mandatory detariffmg" as inconsistent with the 1934 Act.
MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 761-62 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
4. Mark Schankerman, Symmetric Regulation for Competitive Telecommunications, 8
INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (1996). ("[AII forms of asymmetric regulation contain an intrinsic bias
toward some firms or technologies .... "). Id. at 6.
5. Prof. Dr. Gtinter Knieps, Interconnection and Network Access, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. S90, S99 (2000).
There is a wide range of possible asymmetric regulation. Whereas, in the past,
legal entry barriers protected monopolistic carriers, the regulatory pendulum now
seems to swing in the opposite direction. Asymmetric regulation in favor of
newcomers is motivated by the conviction that, even after the abolishment of the
legal monopoly, the incumbent carrier would still possess a factual monopoly
position on the network infrastructure and the normal voice telephone service.
2002]
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Likewise, ambiguities in trade policy jeopardize mutually
beneficial market access initiatives. The trade policy making
apparatus offers similar gaming and brinkmanship opportunities as
some stakeholders seek to shoehorn new services into definitions and
classifications that impose less burdensome market access
commitments, or qualify for exemptions from otherwise applicable
requirements. For example, most nations have made far greater
market access commitments for telecommunications than for
audiovisual services. More fundamentally, market access
commitments appear more robust and straightforward for goods than
for services. Concerns about preserving national culture and
sovereignty have prompted nations to shield and nurture indigenous
audiovisual content ventures.6
Does ICE convergence allow concerns, expressed in trade policy
forums about foreign cinema market penetration and "cultural
imperialism," '7 to support restricted market access for Internet-
mediated audio and video services, like that provided through real
time "streaming" delivery of digital packets? Do cultural exceptions,
applicable to broadcasting and satellite-delivered programming,
Therefore, initial support of newcomers, at least for a sufficient transition period,
has been recommended recently in the national regulatory debates ....
Id.
6. Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of Internet
Regulation, 6 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 445, 466-67 (2001) (citing UNESCO, 5th Annual Conference
on Adult Education, at http://www.unesco.org/opi/eng/confintea/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2002)).
Indeed, the American-dominated governance and perceived over-
commercialization of the Internet have rekindled old, international ideological
debates. The UNESCO has said that lack of access to the Internet by the poor
countries of the world is unfair, and use of the Internet by the rich countries to
transfer their values, languages and cultural norms to these poor countries raises
anew issues of"cultural imperialism."
Id. "Cultural imperialism is the purposive cultural domination, especially through the mass
media and popular culture, of a country or region by another country or region. European
nations, particularly France, have leveled this accusation against the United States since the
early part of the 20th century." Id. at n.125 (citing ROBERT KUISEL, SEDUCING THE FRENCH:
THE DILEMMA OF AMERICANIZATION (1993); REINHOLD WAGNLEITNER, COCA-COLONIZATION
AND THE COLD WAR (1994); THOMAS MCPHAIL, ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM (1987)).
7. See Thomas M. Murray, The US.-French Dispute Over GATT Treatment of
Audiovisual Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How An Efficient Market
Solution Was "Rent-Seeking, " 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 203 (1997); W. Ming Shao, Is
There No Business Like Show Business? Free Trade and Cultural Protectionism, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 105, 129 (1995); Robin L. Van Harpen, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow up to be
Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 165
(1995). But cf C. Edwin Baker, An Economic Critique of Free Trade in Media Product, 78
N.C. L. REv. 1357 (2000) (challenging economic justifications for free trade in audiovisual
products).
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extend to Internet ventures providing functionally equivalent
services? Similar issues arise in telecommunications policy and
regulatory forums where decision makers have established bright line
distinctions between regulated telecommunications and unregulated
enhancement of leased services, or the creation of content transported
by carriers.
This article will examine a number of semantic
telecommunications and trade classifications with an eye toward
determining whether technological convergence and regulatory
opportunism defeat the possibility of establishing a multiple track
regime that distinguishes between basic and enhanced services in
telecommunications and between telecommunications and
audiovisual services. Additionally the article scrutinizes marketplace
anomalies created by Internet-based services that do not readily fit
into any existing classification. For example, Internet-mediated
"streaming" of visual and audio content has characteristics akin to
broadcasting, but it also qualifies for a largely unregulated status
because the service involves packet switched, value-added data
communications. Other innovations, like Internet telephony, possibly
fit into more than one classification. Some technological applications
erode preexisting rules and policies like the international accounting
rate division of long distance toll revenues.
The marketplace attractiveness of some new services results, in
part, from trade and regulatory classifications that can accord
arbitrage opportunities by blocking market access, or by avoiding
costly regulatory burdens. The article concludes with suggestions on
how legislators, regulators, and trade policy makers might curb
regulatory opportunism by abandoning the strategy of classifying
carriers and services based on static technological or market share
assumptions.
I. SEMANTIC GAME PLAYING
Over the years, incumbents and newcomers alike have gamed the
regulatory process to secure a competitive advantage in terms of
reduced regulation or cost savings. Deregulatory initiatives in the
United States replace one regulatory regime with another.8 With
8. Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger & Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at Telecom
Deregulation: The European Advantage, 12 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 561, 565 (1999) ("In essence,
legislatures liberalize an economic sector by 're-regulating' rather than deregulating it."). Id.
2002]
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skillful maneuvering, both incumbents and market entrants can
provide unregulated services functionally equivalent to what a
substantially regulated carrier offers. Other strategies involve
securing a classification that exempts the operator from more
burdensome regulatory duties, or qualifies the operator to tap into cost
savings or cost avoidance opportunities.
Currently, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") in the United
States can qualify for reciprocal interconnection payments from local
exchange carriers without having to generate a return flow of traffic.9
ISPs also can offer Internet-mediated long distance telephone services
free of both interconnection charges and the duty to make universal
service contributions, obligations that are borne by competitors.' 0
Cable television service providers can leverage their non-common
carrier status to avoid having to provide open access to new Internet
access services, despite the fact that they compete with telephone
companies whose legacy of common carrier regulation extends to
such services."
Other longer-standing tactics include selecting a favorable
jurisdiction (federal instead of state), legal classification (private
9. Rebecca Beynon, The FCC's Implementation of the 1996 Act: Agency Litigation
Strategies andDelay, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 27,39 (2000).
Each time a customer places a call to the ISP, the incumbent carrier winds up
paying the competing carrier a per-minute termination fee. Consider also the
nature of ISP traffic. First, such traffic is typically "one-way." That is, many
customers call an ISP in order to connect to the Internet, but an ISP seldom
places calls to other customers. Second, calls made to ISPs are typically much
longer than the average voice call, since people often surf the Intemet for hours at
a time. The potential for regulatory arbitrage is obvious-a competing carrier that
signs up an ISP as a customer stands to collect far more in reciprocal
compensation fees than it will pay out in connection with serving that customer.
Id.
10. See Seventh Report and Order and Thirteenth Order on Reconsideration and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 8078 (1999). See also, Robert M. Frieden,
Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARVARD
J.L. & TECH. 395 (2000); Seth A. Cohen, Deregulation, Defragmenting & Interconnecting:
Reconsidering Commercial Telecommunications Regulation in Relation to the Rise of Internet
Telephony, 18 J.L. & COM. 133 (1998); Katherine Collins, International Accounting Rate
Reform: The Role of International Organizations and Implications For Developing Countries,
31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1077 (2000); Henry E. Crawford, Internet Calling: FCC
Jurisdiction Over Internet Telephony, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 43 (1997); Hank Intven et al.,
Internet Telephony-the Regulatory Issues, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (1998); Dennis
W. Moore Jr., Regulation of the Internet and Internet Telephony Through the Imposition of
Access Charges, 76 TEX. L. REV. 183 (1997); Jamie N. Nafziger, Time To Pay Up: Internet
Service Providers' Universal Service Obligations Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37 (1997).
11. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Or. 1999), revd, 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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carrier instead of common carrier) 12 and cash flow status (reseller
instead of facilities-based carrier). With skillful maneuvering, both
incumbents and market entrants can provide unregulated services
functionally equivalent to what a substantially regulated carrier offers.
This involves securing a classification that exempts the operator from
more burdensome regulatory duties or qualifies the operator to tap
into cost savings or cost avoidance opportunities.
II. A LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE U.S.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
The authors of the Telecommunications Act of 1996" (the "1996
Act") had great expectations 14 that they could engineer competition
and enhance consumer welfare simply by rewriting a law to remove
regulatory barriers to competition. 15 Congress assumed that it could
12. James H. Lister, The Rights of Common Carriers and the Decision Whether
to Be a Common Carrier or a Non-Regulated Communications Provider, 53 FED. COMM. L.J.
91, 92-96 (2000).
13. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §151 etseq. (2001).
14. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence:
Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 983 (1997).
In the floor discussions of the new legislation, it was commonplace to hear that a
vision of "the convergence of these technologies" lay at "the heart of this reform
effort," [citing 142 CONG. REc. HI 161 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Oxley)] that it was about time for Congress to update the law to catch up
with the new convergence in video, computer and telephone technologies, [citing
141 CONG. REc. S8464 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy)] and
that the bill would "allow the cable, telephone, computer, broadcasting, and other
telecommunications industries more easily to converge and transform
themselves" [citing 141 CONG. REc. S8477 (daily ed. June 15, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Pressler)]. Digitalization, among other things, had rendered modes of
transmitting information interchangeable; as a result, many in Congress believed
that historic divisions, artificially supported by legislative distinctions and federal
and state bureaucratic arrangements, needed to be dissolved.
Id. See also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
15. For background on the Telecommunications Act of 1996, see Robert M. Frieden, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Predicting the Winners and Losers, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L. J. 11 (1997). See also Aimee M. Adler, Competition in Telephony: Perception or
Reality? Current Barriers to The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 7 J. L. & POL'Y 571 (1998);
Michael Glover & Donna Epps, Is The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Working? 52 ADMtN.
L. REV. 1013 (2000); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29
CONN. L. REV. 123, 127 (1996); Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of the Marketplace: A Guide to the
1996 Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251 (1997); John C. Roberts, The Sources
of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53
SMU L. REV. 143 (2000).
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craft legislation that created complementary incentives.' 6 In exchange
for cooperating with competitors, incumbents could serve new
markets, while market entrants could provide consumers with the
benefits of competition by erecting new networks, but also by
reselling the services of incumbent carriers. For incumbent Bell
Operating Companies, the law links access to long distance markets
with affirmative steps to open their networks to new local exchange
service competitors. 17 The drafters of the law also sought to motivate
competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") to construct facilities
that would stimulate demand with lower prices and new options rather
than continuing to rely on initial reselling opportunities using the
services of incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"). i8 The law
16. Price, supra note 14, at 982. ("There was a headiness to the rhetoric, a sense that a
legislative revolution would assist, and perhaps even underwrite, a technological and
organizational revolution in which past media categories would be swept away and a new era of
national achievement and citizen and consumer empowerment would be achieved."). Id.
17. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2001) (LATA is an acronym for Local Access and
Transport Area, a geographical region created in the AT&T divestiture case within which the
spun-off Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") can provide local and toll services.). See also
Bell Operating Company Entry Into InterLATA Services. Id. § 271 (This section contains a
fourteen-point checklist to which BOCs must adhere before being allowed into the interLATA
long distance telephone service markets. See id. § 153. The 14 point competitive checklist
requires the Bell Operating Companies to provide: 1) full and fair interconnection with
competitive local exchange carriers in accordance with the requirements of sections 251 (c)(2)
and 252(d)(1); 2) nondiscriminatory and "A la carte" access to network elements in accordance
with the requirements of sections 25 l(c)(3) and 252(d)(1); 3) nondiscriminatory access to the
poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or controlled by the Bell Operating Company at
just and reasonable rates* in accordance with the requirements of section 224; 4) local loop
transmission from the central office to a customer's premises, unbundled from local switching
or other services; 5) local transport from the trunk side of a wire line local exchange carrier's
switch unbundled from switching or other services; 6) local switching unbundled from transport,
local loop transmission, or other services; 7) nondiscriminatory access to 911 emergency
services, directory assistance services to allow the other carriers' customers to obtain telephone
numbers and operator call completion services; 8) white pages directory listings for customers
of other carriers' telephone exchange services; 9) nondiscriminatory access to telephone
numbers for assignment to the other carriers' telephone exchange service customers,
nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and
completion; 10) nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for
call routing and completion; 11) number portability, i.e., the ability of a former BOC customer
to retain use of a preexisting telephone number after having subscribed to telephone service
from another carrier; 12) nondiscriminatory access to such services or information as are
necessary to allow requesting carriers to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the
requirements of section 251(b)(3), i.e., the same number of digits dialed for either BOC or
alternative service; 13) reciprocal compensation. Id. § 271 (c)(2)(B)).
18. Alexandra M. Wilson, Harmonizing Regulation by Promoting Facilities-Based
Competition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 729, 730 (2000) ("Because the 1996 Act alone will not
solve the regulatory convergence problem, the dilemma policymakers face is how to change the
current system to alleviate the detrimental effects of asymmetrical regulation, and how to avoid
the reflexive application of shopworn regulatory antecedents."). Id.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPPORTUNISM
has not stimulated substantial competition in local telecommunication
services because Congress underestimated the ability of stakeholders
to maintain or create a competitive advantage by thwarting progress
through litigation,' 9 and through the exploitation of ambiguous
statutory language.2°
Technological innovations and market convergence in
telecommunications require commensurate adjustments in the legal
and regulatory arena, particularly when ventures can now provide
functionally equivalent services yet face different regulatory
treatment. Legislative changes to the status quo are infrequent,2'
while "regulatory lag"22 becomes a more common occurrence. A
significant period of time may run before regulations reflect changes
in technological and marketplace circumstances.23 During such
periods of delayed adjustment, the regulatory process may favor one
competitor over others. This happens particularly when marketplace
conditions trigger new competitive opportunities and technological
convergence eliminates barriers to market entry or market
segmentation. A current example is the different regulatory treatment
of an ILEC providing Internet access provided via conditioned
telephone lines, commonly known as a Digital Subscriber Link
("DSL") service versus the regulatory treatment of a cable television
company provided Internet access. The former currently triggers
conventional common carrier regulation while the latter qualifies for
unregulated private carrier status.24
19. See generally Beynon, supra note 9.
20. See generally Kathleen Wallman, A Birthday Party: The Terrible or Terrific Two's?
1996 Federal Telecommunications Act, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 229 (1998).
21. Roberts, supra note 15, at 146 ("Congress repeatedly ignored or rebuffed calls by the
FCC and critics to amend and update the 1934 Act to provide guidance on emerging issues and
technologies."). Id.
22. Robert W. Crandall & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition and Regulatory Policies for
Interactive Broadband Networks, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1221 (1995) (defining regulatory lag
as "the general delay in the responses of regulators to changes in cost or market conditions.").
23. James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty of Policy, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
849 (2000) ("For the transition to competition to succeed, asymmetric measures to control
market power should be phased out as the incumbent's market power diminishes."). Id. at 850.
24. The FCC acknowledges this regulatory asymmetry and seeks to establish a consistent
and uniform regulatory platform. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
Over Cable and Other Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,287 (2000); Review of
Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Services, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,745 (2001); Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22,781 (2001). See also, Appropriate Framework
For Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of
2002]
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Comparatively lighter regulation of market entrants may
properly incubate and promote incipient competition. On the other
hand, however, without recalibration, a regulatory dichotomy may
distort markets and handicap incumbents who deserve similar
deregulation or streamlined government oversight.
The authors of the 1996 Act thought they had rebalanced the
telecommunications regulatory regime to promote more robust
competition without unduly favoring entrants with preferential
treatment or unfairly allowing incumbents to exploit their market
power in using anticompetitive practices. To the apparent dismay of
Congress, telecommunication and information service providers have
proven themselves quite adept at exploiting opportunities to capture
greater profits and market share by tilting the competitive playing
field to their advantage.26 While designed to achieve market access
parity, the 1996 Act, like so many laws and implementing regulations
before it, has become a vehicle for clever interpretation, exploitation,
and litigation.27
For example, Congress thought that it could ensure market
access parity through a one-size-fits-all regulatory classification, as
demonstrated in legislation denoting common carriage status for all
types of commercial service providers. 28  However, Congress also
authorized the FCC to eliminate aspects of traditional common carrier
responsibilities should the public interest support it.29  The new
Broadband Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) (seeking to
develop a single uniform and consistent regulatory regime that applies to different Internet
access technologies and carriers and refrains from extending preexisting regulatory burdens).
25. Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 32-33 (2000). Some critics of FCC policies requiring ILECs to share local distribution
facilities allege that such
unbundling would be a classic case of asymmetric regulation: the CLEC would
pursue the more profitable, unregulated service, while the ILEC would be left
providing basic local service (in many cases, below cost). Innovation would be
eroded by regulations that arbitrarily favored CLECs, without regard to the
adverse effect of such asymmetric regulation on the welfare of consumers.
Id.
26. See generally Eli M. Noam, The Future of Telecom, The Future of
Telecommunications Regulation, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1473 (1999).
27. See generally Stanley M. Gorinson, Deregulation in Telecommunications:
Competition or Confusion?, FED. LAW. Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 24.
28. See 1996 Act, § 3(44), 47 U.S.C. §153(44) (2001) (deeming every
telecommunications carrier a "common carrier under this [Act] only to the extent that it is
engaged in providing telecommunications services."). Id.
29. Id. § 160(a). The FCC "shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of
[the Communications Act].. . if enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to
ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations... are just and reasonable and
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legislative mandate to undo common carrier responsibilities, like
filing and complying with tariffs,3° combine with previous FCC
efforts selectively to streamline regulations, if not deregulate
entirely.3 Collectively, these apparently procompetitive initiatives
have expanded the dichotomy between the nature and scope of
regulation applied to dominant, incumbent carriers vis-6t-vis market
entrants and other carriers that qualify for streamlined regulation or
none at all. Additionally, these initiatives blur the distinction between
traditionally regulated common carriers and their unregulated private
carrier counterparts, because common carriers, subject to "legacy"
are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory," enforcement is not necessary to protect
consumers and forbearance is "consistent with the public interest." Id. (enumerations omitted).
30. In MCI Telecom. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down "mandatory detariffing" as inconsistent with
the Communications Act of 1934. See also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), aft'd sub nom. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)
(ruling that the FCC could not suspend (permissively or mandatorily) the tariff filing obligations
for interexchange carriers, whether they had market power or not). See also MCI Worldcom,
Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
31. See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979);
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59
(1982) (recon. denied) 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for
Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308 (Apr. 22, 1982); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Third Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,292 (June 21, 1983); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Third Report and Order, 48
Fed. Reg. 46,791 (Oct. 14, 1983); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983);
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Therefor, Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,856 (Mar. 28, 1984);
Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Therefor, Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates
for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Therefor, Sixth Report and Order 99
F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub nom. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Competition in the Interstate Interexehange Marketplace, Report and
Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 5880, 5881 2 (1991); Competition in the Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, 7 F.C.C.R. 2677 (1992) (on recon.); Competition in the Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, 8 F.C.C.R. 2659 (1993) (on further recon.); Competition in the Interstate
Interexchange Marketplace, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 3668 (1993); Competition in
the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 10 F.C.C.R. 4562 (1995) (on further recon.) (reducing
scope of AT&T's dominant carrier status and allowing provision of service based on customized
tariffs preceded by a contract for carriage); Competition in the Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, 10 F.C.C.R. 4421 (1995) (further recon. den.).
182 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
regulations, can offer unregulated services using the same
technologies and equipment used to provide conventional services
while market entrants can use similar technologies and equipment to
provide unregulated services that provide an alternative to incumbent
carriers' conventional services.32 Some telecommunications ventures
have avoided these costly regulatory burdens simply on the grounds
that they lack market power,33 or because they have semantically
crafted services so that they qualify for little or no regulatory
oversight.
On the other hand, some incumbents have continued to incur
such burdens despite changed circumstances and the 1996 Act
requirement that all service providers, regardless of regulatory
classification, should bear on a competitively neutral basis the
obligation of making financial contributions to support universal
access to basic telecommunications.3 4  For example, ISPs and other
ventures providing enhancements to leased lines do not pay local
exchange carrier access charges. Additionally, they do not contribute
to universal service funding even when providing services that, if
provided by other carriers, would trigger such payments.35
Both newcomers and subsidiaries of incumbents may secure
regulatory exemptions on semantic grounds by characterizing and
offering services in a way that qualifies for diminished regulation.
Incumbents may exploit regulatory inertia that maintains regulatory
safeguards and barriers to market entry based on persisting concepts
of natural monopoly and a strained view that only one enterprise can
achieve public policy objectives like effectively executing a universal
32. See Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REv 955 (1997).
33. The MIT Dictionary of Modem Economics defines market power as the "ability of a
single, or group of buyer(s) or seller(s) to influence the price of the product or service in which
it is trading. A perfectly competitive market in equilibrium ensures the complete absence of
market power." THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 268 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th
ed. 1992).
34. 47 U.S.C. §254(d) (2001) ("Every telecommunications carrier that provides interstate
telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to
the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to preserve
and advance universal service."). See also Id. §254(h)(2)(A) ("Advanced services. The
Commission shall establish competitively neutral rules-(A) to enhance, to the extent technically
feasible and economically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information
services for all public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries;...") See also Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999) cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213
(2000).
35. Frieden, supra note 10, at 422-30.
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service mission. Alternatively, incumbent carriers may create
separate subsidiaries to qualify for unregulated or lightly regulated
non-dominant, market entrant status.36
III. TRADE FORUMS HAVE CREATED SIMILAR ARBITRAGE
OPPORTUNITIES
Trade policies regulating telecommunications do not operate
using technology neutral definitions and assumptions. Instead,
definitions and classifications establish a vertical, top-down structure,
perhaps, in part, because the trade policy-making apparatus that first
applied solely to goods was subsequently retrofitted to apply to
services. The supply chain for the manufacture, distribution, and
retail sale of goods lends itself to a vertical model. Services,
particularly ICE services operating in a convergent marketplace,
support a horizontal analysis that considers functional equivalents
regardless of supplier or technology.
The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 37 provides
greater specificity and clarity of market access commitments with less
regard to specific types of goods. The General Agreement on Trade
in Services 38 offers less global coverage, instead relying on industry
specific annexes and the definitions contained in them. With a
baseline goods versus service dichotomy, it likely becomes easier to
derive additional dichotomies that help flesh out basic definitions.
With this kind of construct, a trade policy-making system can
separate content from conduit and thereby specify different levels of
market access as between telecommunications and audiovisual
services. Increasingly, nations have made market access
commitments in telecommunications-both basic and value-added-
even as few, if any, new initiatives apply to audiovisual services.
36. As part of its initial deregulatory thrust in the 1980's the FCC developed a regulatory
dichotomy between dominant carriers, to be subject to conventional, but possibly streamlined
regulation, and non-dominant carriers to be subject to regulatory forbearance based on the view
that carriers lacking market power should not be burdened with regulations designed to curb the
potential for dominant carriers to engage in anticompetitive practices. See Scott M.
Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications Market: The
Dominant/Nondominant Carrier Approach and the Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED. COMM.
L.J. 367 (1997).
37. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, amended by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1154
(1994).
38. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IB, 33 I.L.M. 1167
(1994).
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Quite legitimate concerns about sovereignty and culture warrant
greater caution in the audiovisual sector. However, ICE convergence
provides new opportunities to expand and leverage these concerns so
as to shelter new services that seamlessly blend telecommunications
transport with content. Indeed the Internet offers an example of such
convergence as one cannot easily distinguish and separate the content
delivery function from the content alone. Accordingly, when market
access initiatives are not forthcoming for Internet-mediated services,
do concerns about sovereignty and culture forestall progress?
Conversely, might ventures providing such services consider the lack
of market access an arbitrage opportunity to extract greater financial
rewards through lessened competition?
IV. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Regulatory arbitrage refers to the ability of stakeholders to
exploit differences in legislative and regulatory classifications with an
eye toward securing more favorable or less burdensome regulatory
treatment that typically will accrue financial and competitive
advantage.39  Stakeholders in the United States have exploited
loopholes to secure a competitive or financial windfall for several
reasons. One reason is that the organic legislation mandating
regulatory reform contained ambiguities and relied on the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to determine the will of
Congress and to implement the deregulatory process. Loopholes have
also been exploited because courts reviewing the FCC's
implementation of legislation only conditionally defer to the expert
regulatory agency's expertise. Exploitation also occurs because
shared jurisdiction between the states and the FCC generally conflict,
particularly when initiatives shift opportunities to receive subsidies
and duties to finance subsidies.
Evading a regulatory burden can translate into cost savings and
greater nimbleness in a competitive environment. Sometimes
avoiding a regulatory requirement means that the stakeholder can
save money or even qualify for a flow of unexpected revenues. The
arbitrage aspect of this brinkmanship involves the strategic targeting
and qualifying to receive lax or favorable regulatory treatment while
at the same time retaining the ability to offer functionally equivalent
39. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRucTURE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
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services that compete with offerings of other stakeholders subject to
more burdensome, costly, and unfavorable regulatory treatment.
Over the years, a number of such regulatory anomalies and
asymmetries have occurred. For example, the price, but not
necessarily the cost, of a minute of telecommunication use has
depended on such factors as the perceived value of the service;
40
which regulatory agency has jurisdiction over cost allocation and
tariffing;41 whether the service is domestic or international; 42 whether
another carrier or end-user seeks facilities interconnection; 43 the type
of carrier44 or enterprise 45 providing service;46 and the type of line or
40. Federal Communications Commission, FCC Releases Semiannual Study on
Telephone Trends, available at 1991 FCC LEXIS 4305 (Aug. 7, 1991). Both the FCC and state
regulatory commissions have allowed carriers to price some services on the perceived value
consumers accrue. For example, some local exchange telephone service rates have increased
when the number of accessible subscribers reaches a benchmark.
In most states, the Bell Operating Companies and larger independents charge
higher rates in metropolitan areas than in rural areas-a pricing practice that
dates back to the turn of the century and is traditionally justified in the belief that
the value of the service provided is higher for subscribers with larger local calling
areas.
Id. at *10.
41. Typically an intrastate long distance minute of use significantly exceeds the price of
an interstate long distance minute of use. Ironically, an intrastate state call originated via a
cellular telephone may be significantly cheaper than the corresponding rate for a call originated
over wireline facilities. The rate differential results, in part, from ratemaking policies, which
may include cross-subsidies to local exchange service, as opposed to actual cost of service
differences.
42. International message telephone service substantially exceeds domestic rates on a per
minute and mileage band basis, primarily because international carriers have negotiated toll
revenue division agreements that have failed to drop commensurately with cost reductions. For
a discussion of these international accounting rates see Rob Frieden, International Toll Revenue
Division: Tackling the Inequities and Inefficiencies, 17 TELECOM. POL'Y 221 (1993); Robert M.
Frieden, Accounting Rates: The Business of International Telecommunications and the Incentive
to Cheat, 43 FED. COM. L.J. I 11 (1991).
43. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and preexisting FCC regulations differentiate
the terms and conditions for interconnection between carriers as opposed to customer-carrier
interconnection. The 1996 Act orders favorable and potentially zero-cost interconnection
between certain types of carriers. For example, Section 251 requires all local exchange carriers
"to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of
telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5) (2001) End-users and interexchange ("long
distance") carriers must pay higher access charges.
44. During a time when interexchange carrier competitors of AT&T received inferior
access to the PSTN, the Commission authorized discounted access charges. However, the
Commission never stated that the discounts were cost-based as opposed to a rough justice
solution designed to reflect both inferior access and the Commission's desire that carriers like
MCI acquire market share. See, e.g., Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access
(ENFIA), Report and Order, 71 F.C.C.2d 440 (1979); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. and the Bell System
Operating Companies Tariff, 93 F.C.C.2d 739 (1983) (on recon.), affd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 712 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Currently, the
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facility providing service 47 and whether the service can access the
Public Switched Telephone Network ("PSTN").
48
FCC is considering whether wireless mobile service providers like cellular radio operators
should have to compensate wireline local exchange carriers for terminating calls while such
wireline carriers do not have to compensate the wireless operators for similar call terminations.
See Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 5020 (1996) (proposing reciprocal
termination between wireline and wireless carriers, including the possibility of an interim zero
termination charge between carriers); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, II F.C.C.R. 15,499
(1996), affid in part and vacated in part sub nom. Competitive Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 117
F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affid in part, rev'd in part, and remanded sub nom. AT&T Corp.
v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Order on Reconsideration, II F.C.C.R. 13,042
(1996); Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, Second Order on Reconsideration, I I F.C.C.R. 19,738 (1996); Implementation of the
Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between
Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Third Order on
Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 12,460 (1997).
45. Captive long distance callers from hotel rooms, and callers not familiar with so called
dial-around options for avoiding price gouging for pay phone service recognize the vast price
differences for long distance telephone service.
46. Certain types of services have qualified for exemption from regulatory burdens that
impose extra costs. For example, enhanced services qualify for non-common carrier status and
its users are exempt from having to pay an access charge payment otherwise applicable to basic
service subscribers. A 1987 FCC initiative to eliminate the exemption generated substantial
opposition by users who claimed the Commission had proposed to impose a modem tax.
Amendments of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, 2
F.C.C.R. 4305, 4305 (1987):
In 1983 we adopted a comprehensive "access charge" plan for the recovery by
local exchange carriers (LECs) of the costs associated with the origination and
termination of interstate calls. [citing MTS and WATS Market Structure,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983)] At that time, we
concluded that the immediate application of this plan to certain providers of
interstate services might unduly burden their operations and cause disruptions in
provision of service to the public. Therefore, we granted temporary exemptions
from payment of access charges to certain classes of exchange access users,
including enhanced service providers.
Id. (proposing to impose access charges on enhanced service lines). Amendments of Part 69 of
the Commission's Rules Relating to Enhanced Service Providers, Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 2631
(1988) (terminated) (abandoning proposal on ground that despite the apparent discrimination in
charges "[a] current state of change and uncertainty" besetting the enhanced services industry
justified ongoing exemption from access charge payments). Id. Currently the FCC requires
users of ISDN services to pay only one Subscriber Line Charge, an access payment, despite the
fact that ISDN circuits can derive more than one voice-grade equivalent channel.
47. The FCC's access charge regime established a different pricing structure for switched
and special access. The former includes regular dial up services and requires end users to pay a
monthly flat-rated Subscriber Line Charge, currently $3.50 for residential and small business
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A. Jurisdictional Brinkmanship
A perennial candidate for regulatory arbitrage lies in securing
favorable jurisdictional treatment. On a cost causation basis,
traversing a state or international boundary should not make much
difference. However, how regulators and carriers allocate costs, and
to which services they attribute cost causation, can result in
substantially different cost levels depending on whether
telecommunications traffic stays within a state, crosses state borders,
or leaves a nation. In contrast, intrastate traffic in the United States
and elsewhere typically triggers higher retail rates than interstate
traffic, even for routes of equal distance. Similarly international
traffic may cost several times as much as domestic rates of equal
mileage.
Given a significant gap between services, as a function of
jurisdictional classification, arbitrage opportunities abound.
Entrepreneurs have engaged in creative traffic routing to shoehorn
services into a preferred jurisdiction. Traffic that originates in one
location and terminates in another location within a single state
nevertheless may traverse an adjacent state by design, simply to avoid
intrastate ratemaking and the jurisdiction of a state public utility
users and $6.00 for other business users. The latter includes leased, private line users, who
certify that the line does not "leak" into the PSTN through the use, for example, of an on-
premises switch like a Private Branch Exchange, that could couple the private line with trunks
that access the PSTN provided by Local Exchange Carriers ostensibly for local switched
services. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Third Report and Order, 93 F.C.C.2d 241
(1983); MITS and WATS Market Structure, Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (modified on recon.); MTS
and WATS Market Structure, Order, 97 F.C.C.2d 834 (further modification on recon.), partially
affd and partially remanded sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n Regl. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 737 F.2d 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Order,
99 F.C.C.2d 708 (1984) (further modification); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 860 (1985) (further recon. den.); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Order, 102
F.C.C.2d 849 (1985). See also Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Order,
101 F.C.C.2d 911(1985); Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Petitions for
Reconsideration and Clarification of Allocation Plan Orders, 102 F.C.C.2d 503 (1985) (recon.
denied); Investigation of Access and Divestiture Related Tariffs, Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 935
(1985).
48. International private line services, which do not access the PSTN, are exempt from
the accounting rate regime. Their per-minute costs are significantly lower than switched
services. Undetected private line leakage has become commonplace making it possible for
resellers to provide a service functionally equivalent to intemational message telephone service
at a fraction of the cost. See Robert M. Frieden, The Impact of Boomerang Boxes and Call-Back
Services on the Accounting Rate Regime, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE PACIFIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 781 (Dan Wedemeyer &
Richard Nickelson, eds., 1996).
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commission.49 Until Canadian long distance telephone rates dropped
to U.S. levels, carriers would transit traffic through the U.S. and back
into Canada, thereby qualifying the traffic for lower Canada-U.S rates
than the higher domestic charges. Similarly, callback operators
import dial tone from nations with low international calling rates even
for domestic calls. Arbitrageurs find and exploit price margins,
whether created by regulation, such as intrastate versus interstate
rates, or different competitive conditions such as high international
calling versus lower calling rates.
Shared jurisdiction need not result in chaos. The European
Union (EU) has achieved policy and regulatory harmonization among
the several different nations making up the EU. The balance between
centralized policy making and subsidiarity requires a "delicate
balance between on the one hand, the necessity of general
harmonization at the level of the EU and the desire for limited
flexibility at the level of its Member States, and on the other hand, the
legislative framework and the implementation of that legislation at a
subordinate level."50  Perhaps the EU generates a comparatively
superior end product, because the EU Commission can provide
greater specificity than the U.S. Congress while still deferring to
individual national legislatures to customize the necessary legislation.
Additionally, a more specific division of labor exists between the EU
Commission, Council, and Parliament.5'
49. The FCC and reviewing courts have rejected a "contamination theory" that if applied
would subject a telecommunications service to intrastate jurisdiction if any portion of the service
was offered solely within one state: "The 'contamination theory' contemplates that a service or
facility used only partially for intrastate communication is not subject to Commission
jurisdiction." United States Dept. of Defense v. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, 38 F.C.C.2d
803, 808 n.17 (1973). But cf Petition of the New York Tel. Co. for a Declaratory Ruling with
Respect to the Physically Intrastate Private Line and Special Access Channels Utilized for Sales
Agents to Computer New York State Lottery Communications, 5 F.C.C.R. 1080 (1990) (stating
that the addition of two physically interstate private lines to a lottery network that is otherwise
comprised of physically intrastate lines does not require the local exchange carrier providing the
service to classify all of the lottery's special access lines as interstate). See also Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 2 F.C.C.R. 3528 (1985); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., Order, 3 F.C.C.R
748 (modified on recon.), vacated as moot sub nom. Hecht Co. v. FCC, No. 87-1396 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 7, 1987); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Amendment of Part 36 of the Commission's
Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, 4 F.C.C.R. 5660 (1989) (establishing definitive
jurisdictional policy on lines having mixed intrastate and interstate use).
50. Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 8, at 584.
51. For background on the organization of the European Commission and its relationship
with member states see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, KEY PLAYERS IN EU LEGISLATION, at
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/pap/ (last updated Apr. 12, 2002).
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B. Semantic Games: International Accounting Rate Arbitrage
Because international accounting rates52 remain at artificially
high levels for many routes, carriers and their customers strategize on
how to route traffic exempt from the settlement process. The vehicles
for avoiding high accounting rates include the use of callback
services, which provide dial tone to end-users physically situated in
another country, and linking international private lines with a switch
that secures access to the PSTN. These options may violate
International Telecommunication Union ("ITU") recommendations5 3
and carrier tariffs, because they enable end-users to secure services in
a manner that the carrier did not intend to provide. While such bypass
strategies may expedite reforms, their use flouts uniform rules of the
road. For example, the ITU Recommendations on leased
international private lines contemplate the consultation and agreement
on the scope of service. Private lines, by definition, provide closed,
intra-corporate networking capabilities, not the functional equivalent
to switched public, long distance services.
What is occurring in international telecommunications parallels
the gray market in international commercial aviation where carriers
look the other way or clandestinely collaborate with ticket resellers,
consolidators and brokers who offer seats at rates well below the
published tariff.54 In international telecommunications, sophisticated
52. For background on how international telecommunications carriers divide toll
revenues using the accounting rate regime see Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the Cracks:
International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU and WTO, 22 TELECOM. POL'Y 963 (1998);
Robert M. Frieden, The Impact of Call-Back and Arbitrage on the Accounting Rate Regime, 21
TELECOM. POL'Y 819 (1997); Robert M. Frieden International Toll Revenue Division-
Tackling the Inequities and Inefficiencies, 17 TELECOM. POL'Y 221 (1993); Paul W. Kenefick, A
Step in the Right Direction: The FCC Provides Regulatory Relief in International Settlements
and International Services Licensing, 8 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 43 (2000).
53. Recommendation D.1, Sec. 7.1.1, in, ITU INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BLUE BOOK, VOL. II, FASCICLE 11.1, suggests that
administrations can condition, consult and agree to the scope of access to public networks
provided to users of international private leased circuits. To the extent that a private line reseller
or end-user does not engage in such consultation and erects a system for accounting rate
evasion, then the host country may deny access to the PSTN. However, in many instances
accounting rate avoidance schemes may go undetected by the carrier providing interconnection.
Id.
54. International carriers do provide discounted rates to high volume users, e.g., as an
incentive to migrate from unmetered private lines to metered "virtual" (software defined) private
lines using the public switched network. The carriers avoid application of artificially high
accounting rates by creating a new service category and applying a different, and lower,
accounting rate. Foreign carriers typically have no obligation to justify how the new rate does
not discriminate against users paying higher charges for existing offerings subject to accounting
rates.
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users and system integrators design private line networks that avoid
accounting rates liability. Carriers originally offered unmetered
private lines as a way to utilize excess capacity and satisfy large
volume user requirements for closed, internal networks. Private
branch exchanges and other customer-controlled equipment have
enabled users to interconnect unmetered international private lines
with local public switched telephone networks. Such leakiness
enables the private line subscriber to access users outside the internal
network. Expanded access to a private line network means that users,
who otherwise would have to use International Message Telephone
Service ("IMTS") circuits, can opt for specially configured private
line access for functionally equivalent service.
Resellers can expand the reach of leaky private lines with higher
capacity switches. Some carriers and their regulatory overseers do
not object to this type of pure resale since it does not enhance leased
lines. Resale stimulates overall capacity demand, and it can reduce
outbound IMTS accounting rate liability, particularly where
regulatory policies block or limit inbound resale. Some carriers,
intent on capturing larger market shares by aggregating and routing
regional traffic through a hub, may engineer a complex array of
private lines and acquire both half-circuits on routes to handle
accounting rate exempt traffic. Transiting, the routing of traffic
destined for another country across domestic facilities, presents
another opportunity for carriers and new international telephone
entrepreneurs alike to engineer innovative new arrangements for
users. 55
Since the early 1990s, the FCC has taken a more proactive role
in accounting rate oversight. The FCC aimed toward encouraging
carrier and end-user self help, through routing strategies that
collectively made high accounting rates unsustainable. The FCC also
adopted a get-tough policy with international carriers, including
55. Even companies with limited budgets can get into the international
telecommunications business and exploit high accounting rate and end user charge differentials.
A boomerang box enables callers, in high cost foreign locations, to place a call to the United
States, hang up and soon receive a call from the United States with the intended call recipient on
the line. At the micro-level, the foreign caller avoids having to pay the significantly higher
charge for originating an international call, the foreign carrier loses some toll revenues and the
USISC handling the international call accrues some additional toll revenues. At the macro-
level, the transaction contributes to the expanding United States accounting rate deficit thereby
blunting the foreign carrier's revenue losses and the USISC's revenue gains. See generally
Frieden, supra note 48.
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56prescribed accounting rates, because it had grown impatient with the
pace of reform in private accounting rate negotiations. While the
FCC can properly condition grants of regulatory authorizations and
prescribe rates for the carriers it regulates, attempts to affect the
behavior and the financial performance of other carriers has generated
vocal opposition from at home and abroad that the Commission had
failed to appreciate international comity and national sovereignty.57
Similarly, an FCC proposal to impose reporting requirements
and other means for overseeing the extent of participation in the U.S.
telecommunications market by foreign-owned firms58  generated
arguments that it would violate the commitment to the national
treatment of foreign enterprises, such as applying identical regulatory
rights, responsibilities and opportunities for foreign-owned carriers as
for domestic carriers. The FCC subsequently decided to calibrate the
scope of regulatory oversight of foreign carriers to the degree of
market access accorded U.S. carriers. This focused particularly on
the extent to which U.S. service providers may use leased
international private lines to access the PSTN in foreign locales.59
56. Regulation of International Accounting Rates, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 5
F.C.C.R. 4948, 4950 (1990) (The Commission proposed to "establish... determine and
prescribe just and reasonable accounting rates" if USISCs and their foreign counterparts failed
to negotiate rates downward to an FCC-determined benchmark range.). Id.
57. When the FCC attempted to influence the timetable for construction and activation of
the TAT-7 overseas cable through direct negotiations with foreign governments, foreign carriers
deemed such activism intrusive of national sovereignty, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia deemed it a violation of the Government in the Sunshine Act.
Petition of ITT World Communications, Inc., Order Denying Petition, 77 F.C.C.R. 877 (1980)
(denying petition for rulemaking on permissible scope of FCC contacts with foreign
administrations to negotiate delayed deployment of a trans-Atlantic submarine communications
cable), reversed, ITT World Communications v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1983), reversed
on other grounds, 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
58. Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications, Notice of Inquiry, 2
F.C.C.R. 1022 (1987); Regulatory Policies and International Telecommunications, Report and
Order and Supplemental Notice of Inquiry, 4 F.C.C.R. 7387 (1988); Regulatory Policies and
International Telecommunications, Order on Reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 323 (1989). The FCC
has modified its policies that impose more extensive oversight of foreign owned carriers
providing international services from the United States. See Regulation of International
Common Carrier Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 577 (1992); Regulation
of International Common Carrier Services, Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 7331 (1992) (retaining
more burdensome "dominant carrier" oversight only where the foreign affiliate of a USISC has
the ability to discriminate against unaffiliated carriers through control of bottleneck services and
facilities in the foreign market).
59. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Mqrket Openings in the Telecommunication Goods and
Service Sectors, 33 INT'L LAW. 27 (1999); John J. Alissi, Comment, Revolutionizing the
Telephone Industry: The World Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications
and the Federal Communications Commission Order, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 485 (1999); Paula
Barnes Sours, Comment, The Impact of US. Regulatory Activity on Prospects for
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This mechanism provides strong leverage for achieving market access
parity by linking the scope of inbound U.S. market access with
reciprocal opportunities for outbound traffic.60
Reliance on proliferating private line resale redirected the FCC
from direct confrontation with foreign carriers over their sovereign
right to negotiate accounting rates to "procedural reforms that remove
any U.S. regulatory impediments to lower, more economically
efficient, cost-based international accounting rates.' The
Commission assumed that if resale were available on both an inbound
and outbound basis, then the incumbent facilities-based carriers
would perceive new incentives to negotiate lower accounting rates to
dissuade customers from migrating to private line and resale options.
Facilities-based USISCs, facing competition from resellers62 who are
unencumbered by accounting rate liability, may view high accounting
rates as imposing a floor on how low they can price end-user rates "to
prevent diversion of... customers to a reseller., 63  Presumably,
resellers providing outbound services from the United States will
acquire market share, thereby reducing the number of IMTS outbound
minutes subject to accounting rate settlements. A facilities-based
carrier, refusing to negotiate accounting rates closer to cost, would
"receive fewer revenues from its IMTS customers and, thus, would
wind up with fewer revenues overall. 64
Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 645 (1998).
60. See Cable & Wireless, Inc., Order and Authorization, 9 F.C.C.R. 7283 (1994); Cable
& Wireless, Inc., Order and Certification, 8 F.C.C.R. 1664 (1993); Fonorola Corp. and EMI
Corp., Order and Certification, 7 F.C.C.R. 7312 (1992); Fonorola Corp. and EMI Corp., Order
on Reconsideration, 9 F.C.C.R. 4066 (1994) (authorizing British and Canadian resellers to
provide international service upon finding that the foreign country on the other end of the circuit
provides equivalent opportunities to U.S. carriers to resell interconnected private lines).
61. Regulation of International Accounting Rates, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 3552
(1991).
62. "Resale [of leased private lines] would bypass the accounting rate mechanism-a
major cost to the traditional carrier mode of operation-and increase the feasibility of creating
unidirectional traffic channels." Ken Cheong & Mark Mullins, International Telephone Service
Imbalances, 15 TELECOM. POL'Y 107, 116 (1991). If resale remains unidirectional, United
States facilities based carriers and consumers will not benefit: Resale occurring only in the
inbound United States direction would increase the United States accounting rate deficit. Resale
must be bi-directional to have the effect of "expos[ing] the differential between tariffs and
accounting rates and ultimately force traditional carriers to renegotiate accounting rates closer to
service costs." Id. at 116-17.
63. Regulation of International Accounting Rates, First Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
559, 560 (1992). "To the extent that the accounting rate is above cost, the underlying carrier
will face a constraint on how much of a reduction in its revenues it can tolerate." Id. at 561,
para. 16.
64. Id.
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C. The Internet as a Medium for Arbitrage
Absent network congestion, the cost to carry or process an
additional minute of Internet traffic approaches zero, because the
incremental cost is near zero.6' This pricing system enhances
consumer welfare, stimulates usage, revenue generation, and accrues
positive networking externalities.66 The Internet adds thousands of
new sites and users daily with such expanded access opportunities
accruing greater utility for all users. As long as ample capacity
remains available along with moderate transport and content costs,
ISPs need not meter traffic and can offer service on an All You Can
Eat ("AYCE") usage insensitive basis.
ISPs can offer AYCE service, because they have been able to
recover high fixed costs and incur relatively low incremental costs
absent network congestion. They can represent that their network
extends globally even though few, outside of a small group of Tier-1
backbone network operators, actually have built or leased such an
extensive array of facilities. Until recently, ISPs have incurred little
additional expense in providing their customers opportunities to
access the Internet networks of networks via incumbent
telecommunication carriers' facilities.67 Accordingly, ISPs have had
opportunities to tap into the same financial and distance insensitive
service opportunities as those available where telecommunication
entrepreneurs exploit the porousness of telecommunication networks
and the relative ease in accessing the PSTN. One can consider
Internet-mediated telephony 68  in the same context as other
65. This pricing scenario presupposes that an ISP does not incur usage sensitive prices for
any major element of service. For many Asia-Pacific routes, the need to access network access
points in far away locations, e.g., the United States, does impose significant costs. To offset the
charges of facilities-based telecommunications carriers, ISPs may charge end users on a usage
sensitive basis, e.g., an hourly surcharge after an initial allocation of access time.
66. A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the Internet
does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users and points of
communications. See John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and
Innovation, 16 RAND J. OF ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985). See also Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L.
REv. 479 (1998).
67. The author acknowledges that "free rider" opportunities via other ISPs are becoming
more scarce as the Internet becomes more hierarchical and larger ISPs demand and receive
payments for providing transit services to ISPs with fewer customers, less bandwidth and
limited sources of desirable content. See Robert M. Frieden, Last Days of the Free Ride? The
Consequences of Settlement Based Interconnection for the Internet, I INFO. 225 (1999).
68. See Robert M. Frieden, Dialing for Dollars: Will the FCC Regulate Internet
Telephony?, 23 RtrrGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47 (1997).
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technological innovations like callback,6 9 switched hubbing,70 refile,7 t
and international simple resale 72 that provide new, lower priced
alternatives to the "retail" rate for toll telephone services.
Internet telephony shifts the balance of market power from
carriers, which traditionally have set prices on a cost-plus basis, to
consumers, who may emphasize price and consider telephony a
commodity business. If telephony minutes of use become fungible,
with voice traffic subordinate to an increasing volume of data, then
service providers will have limited, if any, ability to saddle users with
69. Philippine Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Int'l Telecomm. Ltd., Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 15,001 n.10 (1997) ("'Callback' is a technology used to provide
international telecommunications service from a foreign country" through a switch in the U.S. or
other nation with low collection charges and options for private line resale and routing options
that reduce or eliminate accounting rate liability). See Robert M. Frieden, Falling Through the
Cracks: International Accounting Rate Reform at the ITU and WTO, 22 TELECOM. POL'Y I I
(1998); Robert M. Frieden, The Impact of Call-back and Arbitrage on the Accounting Rate
Regime, 21 TELECOM. POL'Y 819 (1997); Rob Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential
Regulatory and Universal Service Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J. L. & TECH.
8 (1998), at http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/vol3/homeart8.html. See also Refle and
Alternative Calling Procedures: Their Impact on Accounting Rates and Collection Charges,
OECD/GD(95)19 (Paris, 1995) [hereinafter cited as 1995 OECD Refile and Callback Report];
New Technologies and Their Impact on the Accounting Rate System, OECD/GD(97)14 (Paris,
1997) [hereinafter cited as 1997 Accounting Rate Study]. See generally, ROBERT M. FRIEDEN,
MANAGING INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001).
70. Policy Statement on International Accounting Rate Reform, I I F.C.C.R. 3146, 3147
n.3 (1996) (citing Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, Report and Order,
II F.C.C.R. 3873 (1995)) (The FCC defined switched hubbing as "the routing of U.S. switched
traffic over U.S. international private lines, whether resold or facilities-based, that terminate in
equivalent countries and then forwarding that traffic to a third, non-equivalent country by taking
at published rates and reselling the international service of a carrier in the equivalent country.")
Id. at n.9.
71. 1995 OECD Refile and Callback Report, supra note 69, at 1I.
Refile or the hubbing of traffic is using one country to collect traffic and switch
this traffic to other countries .... For example, the price of a call from
Denmark-Finland-Australia is cheaper than a direct call from Denmark to
Australia... US $0.46 + US $1.03 compared to US$2.01. In this case a third
country calling service [using conventional switched services] would be viable
having a margin of US$ 0.52 per minute.
Id.
72. 1997 Accounting Rate Study, supra note 69, at 36. International simple resale
("ISR") involves the use of a private line by more than one customer with access to the public
switched network at one or both ends. ISR presents both profit enhancing opportunities and
bypass threats to facilities-based carriers providing the capacity. On one hand, "[flacility
providers today find that it is more profitable to provide excess capacity to resellers and allow
them to find customers and market this capacity rather than marketing this capacity themselves.
Resale allows more segmented and flexible marketing including more market oriented prices."
Id. On the other hand, "ISR service provision by-passes the international charging and
settlements system, and therefore places significant [downward] pressure on accounting rates."
Id. at38.
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rates significantly above cost, despite the fact that carriers do plow
back a large percentage of any financial surplus to achieve universal
service and infrastructure development objectives.
The onset of Internet-mediated telephony has the potential for
bringing to a head the long-simmering debate over the propriety of
pricing telecommunication services above cost, in part to promote a
universal service mission. It may also trigger closer examination of
what constitutes the actual cost that a carrier incurs to route a minute
of telecommunication traffic:
a polarization [exists] between a group of countries with relatively
competitive prices and low accounting rates, and a second group of
countries with prices significantly above cost.... The danger is
real, especially between OECD countries and a number of non-
OECD countries who have difficulty in envisaging the benefits
which they can attain from competitive telecommunication
markets.
73
D. Internet Telephony Threatens the Status Quo
Currently international accounting rates for most routes
substantially exceed the total cost incurred by two or more foreign
correspondents to switch and route a call from originator to
recipient.74 The onset of higher capacity submarine cables and
satellites coupled with digital signal processing and switching and
circuit multiplication technologies has significantly reduced per-mile
and per-call costs, 75 although the cost savings may not be the same for
73. Id. at 32.
74. Carrier correspondents match half-circuits to erect a complete link from call
originator to call recipient. The half-circuit concept operates on the presumption that carrier
correspondents achieve a whole circuit by linking two half-circuits at the theoretical midpoint of
a submarine cable, or at the satellite providing the transmission link. In the submarine cable
scenario, each carrier has responsibility to secure access to circuits linking transmission facilities
on its territory to the location where the cable makes its landfall (referred to as the cablehead),
possibly located in a different nation, and onward to the midpoint. For more background on
international telecommunications operations and policy, see ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, MANAGING
INTERNET-DRIVEN CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2001); ROBERT M.
FRIEDEN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK (1995).
75. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMM. UNION, THE COST OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE
CALLS, at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/intset/whatare/dot/chap2.html (last updated July 30, 2001)
(reporting that the per minute cost for routing an international telephone call via an INTELSAT
satellite including operating expenses is US$0.02 and that factoring all switching, routing,
interconnection and administrative costs, including license fees, advertising and taxes "the
average per minute cost of an international call is probably around $0.25.") Using a total
service long run incremental cost methodology, which factors in a reasonable contribution to
common costs, the FCC established "upper end" settlement rate benchmarks of 15.40 for
carriers in upper income nations; 19.1¢ for carriers in middle income nations and 23.4¢ for
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nations lacking the traffic volumes and funds available to support new
technologies having lower per unit costs. However, absent
competitive or regulatory pressure to reduce accounting rates and
retail collection charges to levels commensurate with such lower
costs, carriers that terminate more calls than they originate want to
maintain the status quo. Accordingly, accounting rates continue to
overstate cost and overcompensate some operators:
The pace in introducing competition in international
telecommunication markets and the reform of these markets is
slow, and there is an apparent reluctance in many cases by
governments to accelerate reform in this area. It therefore cannot
be expected that significant changes in prices (collection charges)
and accounting rates will take place given present attitudes and
policy frameworks.
76
In the absence of competitive necessity, an aggressive campaign
by regulators in sufficient numbers, or widespread use of Internet
telephony and other arbitrage tactics, many carriers continue to
benefit from traffic retardation strategies that reduce outbound calling
and expand asymmetry between inbound and outbound traffic
volumes.77 For some nations, purposefully high accounting rates and
commensurately high collection charges accrue financial dividends by
reducing the volume of outbound traffic that otherwise would offset at
least a portion of the settlement surplus. Even as they may reduce
some high profit operator-assisted outbound international calls,
carriers is lower income countries. See International Settlement Rates, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 6184 at 6203 47. The Commission proposed a 9-22¢ upper range
for benchmark settlement rates for carriers in upper income nations; 12-26¢ for carriers in
middle income nations and 13-33¢ for carriers in lower income nations. Id. 48. In its 1997
Order, the Commission responded to foreign carrier and government opposition to its proposed
timetable by creating a fourth income category and by extending the transition period. See
International Settlement Rates, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,806 (1997). The FCC established the following
benchmarks and timetables for compliance: U.S.-licensed carriers operating on routes to upper
income countries have one year from the effective date of this Order (until January 1, 1999) to
reach the applicable benchmark rate of 15 cents with carriers in upper income countries. U.S.-
licensed carriers have two years, or until January 1, 2000, to reach the applicable rate of 19 cents
with upper middle income countries, and until January 1, 2001 to reach the same rate with lower
middle income countries. They have until January 1, 2002 to reach the applicable 23-cent rate
with low-income countries, and an additional year, until January 1, 2003, to do so with countries
with a telephone line penetration rate (teledensity) of less than one. Id. at 19,815-16 19, 22.
76. 1997 Accounting Rate Study, supra note 69, at 6.
77. Many international carriers have objected to the FCC's campaign to reduce
international accounting rate tactics on fairness and jurisdictional levels. However, an appellate
court has ruled that the FCC's settlement rate prescription did not violate domestic or
international law, nor did it impose its jurisdiction extraterritorially. See Cable & Wireless v.
FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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callback and other call-reorigination services78 increase the volume of
inbound calls, at least some of which trigger an accounting rate
settlement.79  For nations requiring carriers to route return traffic
proportionate with what they received inbound,80 carriers from other
nations with more outbound traffic than inbound traffic face the
potential for expanding settlement deficits if outbound calling
continues to grow even as demographic characteristics, or regulatory
policies elsewhere continue to dampen demand for inbound calling.
Carriers with inbound traffic surpluses typically operate in small and
developing countries, but others operate in nations that appear to have
a strategy of deliberately maintaining high accounting and collection
rates.
81
Outbound international call retardation strategies create pent-up
demand and stimulate accounting rate and collection arbitrage
opportunities and incentives for users and entrepreneurial carriers82 to
find ways to route traffic that reverse the accounting rate settlement or
avoid triggering one entirely. A settlement surplus generates a source
of hard currency for telecommunications infrastructure development,
and such transfer payments from users in developed nations to
78. 1997 Accounting Rate Study, supra note 69, at 12. ("[Clountry direct benefits U.S.
[and other] consumers but inflates the settlements deficit by converting foreign-originated traffic
into U.S.-billed calls.").
79. Id.
The traditional settlement rate system assumes that a customer's physical
location determines the place of origin of an international call, with the carrier in
the originating country paying a settlement rate to the carrier in the terminating
country. However, service innovations such as callback allow customers to
change the originating country for settlement purposes. The result is that many
more calls are originated for settlement purposes from countries like the United
States with vigorous retail and wholesale markets than in monopoly markets that
lack similar competition. These traffic routing patterns will only be exacerbated
as countries implement their market access commitments under the WTO Basic
Telecom Agreement.
Id. Callback operators look for opportunities to reduce accounting rate exposure, through refile,
and to avoid them entirely by routing traffic via private lines that "leak" into the PSTN.
80. For nations with large populations, high gross domestic products, large ex patriate
and immigrant communities, and multiple facilities-based carriers, e.g., the United States,
operators may have collection rates at levels below one-half the accounting rate. Such carriers
expect to recoup outbound traffic losses with inbound traffic subject to an accounting rate
settlement that would overcompensate the carrier for terminating the call.
81. A thriving international dial-a-porn industry has developed in such diverse and
unpredicted places as Guyana, Russia, and Tuvalu in part because operators can tap into a share
of comparatively higher accounting rates well above the FCC's settlement rate prescription.
82. Many facilities-based carriers offer services with lower per minute charges than
conventional, International Direct Distance dialing. While such carriers do not want to
cannibalize high margin services, they recognize the need to compete with callback operators.
198 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 18
carriers in developing ones can enhance consumer welfare and
promote networking externalities. On the other hand, no guarantees
exist that only developing countries will pursue an outbound call
retardation strategy, or that beneficiaries of settlement surpluses will
use the funds for infrastructure development as opposed to funding
the general treasury or stock dividends. Likewise, reduced outbound
international calling may retard trade, industry and integration of a
nation regionally and globally.
The Internet has evolved into a vibrant medium for
communications, entertainment, education, and commerce. One of
the primary drivers for the growing consumer reliance on Internet-
mediation involves the Internet's ability to offer instant real time
delivery of digital packets in addition to the store and forward non-
real-time delivery of packets in applications like electronic mail. Real
time streaming of information packets means that the Internet can
serve as a medium for audio and video programming and also for
telephone services.
In the accelerated pace of product and service life cycles
common to the Internet, telephone type services have quickly evolved
from an awkward personal computer-mediated curiosity to a
commercial service available not just from computers, but from
conventional telephones as well. Internet telephony has the potential
to serve as a major threat to the international accounting rate regime
and possibly to how telecommunication carriers price retail long
distance services for two primary reasons. First, the Internet
architecture provides for efficient facilities loading, including the
ability of telecommunications networks dedicated for data services to
handle voice traffic at near zero cost, absent congestion. Second,
regulatory policies throughout the world largely exempt providers of
Internet services from having to subject their traffic to accounting rate
settlements and having to pay the interconnection charges and
contributions to universal telecommunications service funding
imposed on telecommunications carriers.
Internet telephony constitutes a formidable vehicle for
compressing telecommunication carrier margins on telephone
services. ISPs can easily add telephony traffic onto their data lines,
and technological innovations provide ways to inject Internet voice
traffic into the PSTN for the last mile delivery to call recipients.
Given the large difference between ISPs' costs incurred in providing
Internet telephony and the retail charges for conventional telephone
services, especially international rates, ISPs can profit handsomely by
pricing service well below the preexisting retail toll charge. This
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exploitation of a wide pricing differential constitutes a type of
arbitrage as the ISP can make a business case for delivering services
to consumers at significantly lower costs. ISPs have plenty of margin
with which to work, such as the difference between its actual costs
and the imputed cost established by route specific accounting rates
based on conventional telephony.
E. Technology Provides Arbitrage Opportunities
Internet telephony uses the digital, packet-switched nature of the
Internet, along with its routing and addressing standards, to provide
83
real-time audio conferencing. Internet switching and routing
technology manages the transmission and processing of text, graphics,
data, audio, or video. The Internet's TCP/IP protocols 84 provide a
standard vehicle for subdividing content, such as a voice
conversation, into a stream of packets that are routed via any available
path between the sender and the intended call recipient. Each packet
has space reserved for destination information so that intermediary
routing facilities can read header data to determine how and where to
send the packets onward toward their intended destination. Headers
include a sequence of digits that correspond to an Internet address,
much like the numbering sequence in direct distance dialing via
telephone.
Packet switching efficiently uses available switching and routing
capacity. Likewise, it can operate despite outages, blockages, and
busy conditions, because the Internet Protocol addressing scheme
83. For a helpful non-technical introduction to Internet telephony see Kevin M. Savetz
and Andrew Sears, Frequently Asked Questions: How Can I Use the Internet as a Telephone?,
THE INTERNET TELEPHONY CONSORTIUM (July 25, 1996), at
http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/MISC/voice_faq.html.
84. Richard Allan Homing, Has Hal Signed a Contract: the Statute of Frauds in
Cyberspace, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 253, 258 (1996).
The common denominator for e-mail communications is the use of a standard
programming protocol, TCP/IP-Transmission Control Protocol/Intemet Protocol-
upon which inter-computer communications are based. The TCP protocol
divides messages into packets that are marked with a sequence number and the
address of the recipient. TCP also inserts error control information. The packets
are then sent over the network to the addressee. The routing of the individual
packets varies, with IP controlling the transport of the packets to the remote host
computer. At the remote host, TCP receives the packets and checks for errors.
When an error occurs, TCP asks for the particular packet to be re-sent. Once all
the packets have been received, TCP will then use the sequence number to
reconstruct the original message. It is the job of IP to get the packets from one
place to another; it is the job of TCP to manage the flow and insure that the data
are correct.
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makes it possible for multiple efforts to route traffic onward in the
event that initial efforts fail. Resending misdelivered or unreceived
packets and routing them via different and possibly circuitous links
requires software processing to reassemble the packets in proper
order. For traffic and services that do not require immediate, real-
time delivery, like electronic mail, possible delays and reassembly
present little problem. However, Internet telephony requires
immediate, real-time delivery of the packets in their proper order.
Any delay, loss, or improper sequencing of packets will result in
distortion or the temporary loss of the audio stream.
Heretofore, Internet telephony has lacked the quality, reliability,
and security to be considered comparable to conventional telephone
services. Traditional telephone services use circuit switching that sets
up a dedicated link between call originator and call recipient. This
technology provides for high quality service and reliability, because a
dedicated pathway exists, as opposed to the virtual, on-the-fly links
provided via the Internet. A dedicated pathway may be
technologically wasteful in the sense that switching, routing, and
transmission capacity lies dormant during pauses in a conversation.
Packet switching technology efficiently fills in gaps with other traffic
so that traffic may traverse different routes and arrive at different
times in getting to the same destination. In circuit switching, all parts
of a traffic stream traverse the same pathway, providing greater
quality assurance.
What Internet telephony lacks in quality of service and
reliability, it makes up for in lower costs and the ability to narrow the
gap between carriers' costs and retail charges. However, some users
may care more about reliability of service and less about savings.
Currently, Internet traffic cannot easily be classified by priority of
service or by type of application. Best efforts in routing of traffic
may not provide the security, safety, and reliability that a user may
require. For those willing to take the qualitative risk, the financial
savings are significant. However, Internet telephony consumers have
to incur some initial, up-front costs. Unlike conventional telephone
service, the cheapest types of Internet-mediated telephony require a
significant initial capital outlay of about $2,000.00 for a personal
computer, modem, sound card, speakers, microphone, software, and
Internet access. Conventional telephone services use an inexpensive,
dumb terminal, the telephone handset, but users incur per-minute
charges that can exceed $1.00 a minute for many international
destinations. Internet telephony provided on a conventional dial-up
basis, such as through a toll-free access number, requires an ISP to
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install devices that can convert circuit switched telephone traffic into
packets and vice versa. Additionally, these devices must provide a
routing function, using the Internet Protocol to bring traffic to a
facility, commonly referred to as a point of presence, in the vicinity of
the call recipient.
F. Financial and Regulatory Arbitrage and the Potential
Impact on Telecommunications Pricing
Internet telephony provides incumbents and newcomers
profitable opportunities to offer services functionally equivalent to
conventional telephony, but treated in a manner that subjects the
service to little or no regulation and accrues lower operational costs.
Entrepreneurs savor the opportunity to exploit financial and
regulatory anomalies and asymmetries in telecommunications. This
is often accomplished in the ability to lease private lines, link them
with the PSTN and offer a long-distance telephone service to
individual consumers who otherwise would not qualify for bulk
discounts offered previously only to high volume private line users.
Internet telephony has the potential to migrate traffic from
conventional telecommunications networks. Incumbent carriers
surely do not want to encourage such a migration, as it will create
downward pressure on all telephone toll rates and cannibalize retail
rates. On the other hand, incumbent carriers will probably determine
that they are financially better off providing the transmission capacity
for Internet telephony, albeit at lower margins, than if they lose
customers' traffic entirely. The massive increase in domestic and
international broadband telecommunication capacity reflects the view
that carriers can make up in volume what they will lose in margin.
V. THE PROBLEMS IN REGULATORY ASYMMETRY
Any regulatory regime applied exclusively to Internet
applications runs the risk of creating a dichotomy in regulatory rights
and responsibilities between providers of functionally equivalent
services. Many of the services available via the Internet provide a
faster, better, cheaper, and smarter evolution of preexisting services.
The Internet provides a convenient, user-friendly medium for
acquiring news and entertainment and for engaging in all sorts of
commercial transactions. A bias or intention not to regulate, or to
lightly regulate such activities, may contrast significantly from a
preexisting and more intrusive regulatory model. Governments
should not automatically extend the application of legacy regulatory
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regimes 85 to Internet-mediated equivalent services. Nor should
governments deregulate incumbent services simply because Internet
options have become available, and governments have opted to apply
a different, and probably less burdensome, regulatory regime to
Internet services.
The onset of Internet-mediated services does present a regulatory
challenge to governments, particularly those disinclined to treat
Internet-mediated services as equivalents to services transmitted and
delivered via traditional media. The juxtaposition of different
regulatory regimes also typically creates an asymmetry that has the
potential for tilting the competitive playing field in favor of the less
regulated service. To the extent regulation can impose financial and
operational burdens, the service provider subject to greater regulation
typically suffers a competitive disadvantage vis-6-vis the less-
regulated operator. Governments should generate compelling
justifications for establishing different regulatory regimes in view of
the potential for such asymmetry to impact the marketplace
attractiveness of one service vis-6-vis others.
Regulatory dichotomies work best when technological categories
remain discrete and absolute. They surely do not work, though, when
technological convergence results in porous service categories and
diversification by operators. When cable telephone and ISPs offer
telephone services functionally similar to that available from
telephone companies, regulators may not be able to maintain
preexisting dichotomies. Heretofore, government regulators have
assumed that incumbent telephone service providers have dominant
market shares, should operate as common carriers and offer the best
technologies and wherewithal to achieve universal service goals.
Government regulators typically assume that market entrants like
ISPs, other enhanced service providers and resellers of basic
transmission capacity do not have the potential to acquire a dominant
market share, or that they offer ancillary, non-common carrier
services. While incumbent telephone companies incur significant
85. JASON OXMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS CoMMISsIoN, THE FCC AND THE
UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET, July 1999, at 24-25, at
http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2002).
New technologies, while perhaps similar in appearance or in functionality, should
not be stuffed into what may be ill-fitting regulatory categories in the name of
regulation. Rather, the Commission should continue the approach of studying
new technologies and only stepping in where the purpose for which the
Commission was created, protecting the public interest, demands it.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPPORTUNISM
financial duties to serve costly remote areas, the newcomers enjoy
exemptions from having to pay charges for accessing the PSTN and
from contributing to universal service funding. These ventures
qualified for such exemptions on grounds that they did not offer
telephone service even though their offerings might require access to
the PSTN.
When ISPs offer consumers telephone service equivalents, which
link PSTN access with Internet-mediated telephony, preexisting
regulatory exemptions tilt the competitive playing field to their
advantage. Should significant telephony traffic volumes migrate to
routings exempt from universal service contribution requirement, the
sum of funds available to achieve the universal service mission will
decline. The potential for declining universal service funds occurs
just as many governments have articulated a broader and more
ambitious universal service mission for all citizens to have access to
both basic telephone service and advanced Internet services.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most national regulators have prudently refrained from
extending legacy regulation to new technologies and services that
may resemble something offered by incumbents. Surely regulation
can drag and thwart marketplace development, and conversely,
regulatory forbearance can incubate and nurture new technologies and
services. However, at some point, newcomers may so develop market
share and service functionally equivalent to what incumbents offer,
but without incurring anything like the regulatory burdens incumbents
bear. At this point, regulatory asymmetry provides for less
marketplace incubation and more marketplace distortion.
The private carrier, enhanced service provider, and interstate
service classification each provided rational exemptions from more
costly and intrusive regulatory classifications in the United States.
Regulatory arbitrageurs, however, came to understand that qualifying
for these classifications provided back-door opportunities to acquire
market share and profits. It appears that the FCC has emphasized the
potential, but no guarantee that private carriers, CLEC affiliates of
ISPs, callback operators and Internet telephony providers will provide
both service diversity and financial savings to consumers. Yet the
Commission does not assess whether these operators might have
generated more consumer welfare enhancements had they been forced
to comply with legacy regulations and had been motivated to join
with incumbents to streamline or reduce them.
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Conferring too comfortable an unregulated niche or financial
windfall eliminates the incentive for ventures to innovate, diversify,
and become facilities-based operators. Unless and until an arbitrage
opportunity closes, resellers, callback operators, and Internet
telephony vendors can possibly do better by conserving capital and
not investing heavily in facilities and developing other indicia of
similarity with incumbents, lest they lose a regulation-conferred
competitive advantage.
Likewise, the trade policy-making apparatus appears to have
conferred regulatory arbitrage opportunities for Internet ventures.
Ventures can provide cable television or Internet-mediated
audiovisual services without triggering market access limitations
applicable to broadcasters, satellite carriers and movie theater
operators. Similarly, ventures are able to offer market access limited
basic services, but characterize them as value-added services, which
typically have greater market access opportunities.
At some point, national regulators and international trade policy-
making forums unwittingly tilt the competitive playing field in favor
of players clever enough to craft a service definition that permits
aggressive competition with incumbent services, but which qualifies
the clever player for a host of arbitrary and anomalous loopholes that
exempt or reduce the cost and inconvenience in regulatory
compliance, or market access limitations. Incumbents may suffer
simply because of the legacy regulations that continue to apply, rather
than because they have greater market share, and the real or perceived
ability to exploit a bottleneck or handicap market entrants with price
squeezes.86
Both telecommunications and trade policy-making forums have
to confront the consequences of ICE convergence. They cannot rely
on service definitions based on static or historical assumptions about
86. In a price squeeze situation, a vertically integrated firm with market power over an
essential upstream input raises the price of this input to rivals competing in downstream retail
markets. The increased cost of this essential input forces downstream rivals to raise their retail
prices. The vertically integrated firm is then in a position to undercut the downstream rivals in
retail markets and thereby increase market share and profits. See MICHAEL KENDE, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMiSSION, THE DIGITAL HANDSHAKE: CONNECTING INTERNET
BACKBONES, Sept. 2000, at http://www.fcc.gov/opp/workingp.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2002).
See also, United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1945)
(articulating a four-part test for price squeeze: (1) a firm has monopoly power with respect to
one product, (2) its price for that product is higher than a "fair price," (3) that product is required
to compete in a second market where the monopolist itself competes, and (4) the monopolist's
price in the second market is so low that competitor's cannot match it and still earn a "living
profit.").
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what technology can do. They must devise technology neutral
classifications and recognize that technological and marketplace
convergence integrates content and conduit. Technology neutrality
examines the nature of the service without regard to the medium or
mode of delivery.
This model has the potential for expanding the reach of
regulation, but offers greater consistency and rationality. Regulatory
expansion might occur if cultural concerns led nations to expand
audiovisual restrictions to cable television and Internet-mediated
services. However, greater consistency and rationality occurs when
regulators concentrate on the effect and impact on consumers and the
scope of competition without regard to the medium or technology
used to access consumers and penetrate markets.
The European Union has embraced a technology-neutral,
horizontal approach to telecommunications regulation in response to
technological and marketplace convergence:
Regulation needs to be transparent, clear and proportional and
distinguish between transport (transmission of signals) and content.
This implies a more horizontal approach to regulation with a
homogenous treatment of all transport network infrastructure and
associated services, irrespective of the nature of the services
carried. A balanced solution as to how public broadcasting can be
best integrated into the new environment is needed.
87
Such a technology-neutral model should be the basis of future
revisions to ICE regulation.
87. Press Release, European Commission, Results of the Public Consultation on the
Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information
Technology Sectors, (Mar. 10, 1999), at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/ip164en.html.
See also The Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology
Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: Results of the Public Consultation on the Green
Paper [COM(97)623], COM(99)108 final, available at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/com(99)108/com(99)108enfinal.html; Green Paper on
the Convergence of the Telecommunications, COM(97)623 final.
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